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Essays on the Economics of 
Local Labor Markets
Matthew J. Notowidigdo 
This thesis studies the economics of local labor markets. 
There are three chapters in the thesis, and each one examines 
how economic outcomes are affected by local labor market 
conditions.
Chapter 1
The fi rst chapter analyzes the incidence of local labor 
demand shocks. It begins from the observation that low-skill 
workers are comparatively immobile. When labor demand 
slumps in a city, college-educated workers tend to relocate, 
whereas noncollege workers are disproportionately likely to 
remain and face declining wages and employment (Glaeser 
and Gyourko 2005). A standard explanation of these facts 
is that mobility is more costly for low-skill workers (Topel 
1986; Bound and Holzer 2000). 
In this chapter, I propose and test an alternative explana-
tion that focuses on why low-skill workers may be dispro-
portionately compensated during adverse labor demand 
shocks, rather than why it may be disproportionately costly 
for them to migrate. This explanation has two components. 
First, I document that adverse shocks substantially reduce 
the cost of housing. This fact and the existing evidence that 
the expenditure share on housing declines with income imply 
that low-skill workers are disproportionately compensated 
by housing price declines. Second, means-tested public as-
sistance programs disproportionately compensate low-skill 
workers during adverse shocks. I document that, not surpris-
ingly, aggregate transfer program expenditures are highly 
responsive to local labor market conditions. 
These two different types of explanations (one based on 
mobility costs and one based on com pensating factors) are 
not incompatible; however, their relative importance ulti-
mately determines the actual incidence of local labor demand 
shocks. If out-migration of workers is low primarily because 
of mobility costs, then the incidence of local labor demand 
shocks will be primarily borne by workers; additionally, to 
the extent that mobility costs are greater for low-skill work-
ers, they may disproportionately bear the incidence of the 
adverse shock. Alternatively, if the incidence of adverse local 
labor demand shocks is primarily borne by immobile housing 
and social insurance programs, then low-skill workers will 
be disproportionately compensated and, consequently, less 
likely to out-migrate.
 I develop and estimate a spatial equilibrium model that 
captures how wages, population, housing prices, and transfer 
payments reequilibrate following a shift in local labor de-
mand. The model is based on the spatial equilibrium model 
in Roback (1982). Following Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), 
the model allows for a concave local housing supply curve, 
arising from the durability of the local housing stock.1 While 
the Glaeser and Gyourko model assumes perfect mobility, 
I allow for heterogeneous mobility costs that limit spatial 
arbitrage, as in Topel (1986). Unlike the preceding models, I 
explicitly model local labor demand. 
The two primary empirical implications of the model 
are 1) if positive labor demand shocks increase population 
more than negative shocks reduce population, it suggests the 
existence of a concave housing supply curve and/or hetero-
geneous mobility costs; and 2) if positive shocks increase 
housing prices more than negative shocks reduce housing 
prices, that is consistent with the existence of heterogeneous 
mobility costs. 
The model guides the empirical strategy, which consists 
of two steps. In the fi rst step, I test for asymmetric responses 
of wages, employment, population, and housing prices to 
symmetric labor demand shocks. The validity of this exercise 
requires constructing plausibly exogenous positive and 
negative shifts in local labor demand of equal magnitude. I 
follow Bartik (1991) in constructing an instrumental variable 
for local labor demand shocks by interacting cross-sectional 
differences in industrial composition with national changes 
in industry employment shares. I fi nd robust evidence using 
U.S. census data that positive local labor demand shocks 
increase population (and employ ment) more than negative 
shocks reduce population (and employment), and that this 
asymmetry is greater for low-skill workers. These robust 
asymmetric relationships for local population and employ-
ment contrast sharply with the absence of any evidence of a 
similar asymmetric relationship for (any measure of) wages, 
housing values, and rental prices, though all of these other 
variables are consistent with an asymmetric housing supply 
curve and limited mobility costs. 
To quantitatively estimate the magnitude of mobility costs 
by skill and the shape of the housing supply curve, in the 
second set of empirical analyses I estimate the full model us-
ing a nonlinear, simultaneous equations generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimator. The GMM estimates suggest 
that the housing supply curve is concave (so that housing 
is more elastically supplied following increases in housing 
demand than following decreases in housing demand) and 
that (over decadal time horizons) mobility costs are not large 
and are comparable for both high-skill and low-skill workers. 
The GMM results reveal several other important fi ndings. 
First, the observed asymmetric population responses are pri-
marily accounted for by an asymmetric housing supply curve 
rather than due to substantial barriers to mobility. Second, 
the results suggest that the observed difference in out-migra-
tion by skill is primarily accounted for by transfer payments 
rather than to differences by skill in housing expenditure 
shares. Lastly, the results suggest that the primary explana-
tion for the comparative immobility of low-skill workers is 
not higher mobility costs, but rather a lower incidence of 
adverse local labor demand shocks. Consequently, much of 
the incidence of adverse labor demand shocks is diffused to 
homeowners, landlords, and public assistance programs. 
Chapter 2
The second chapter, written jointly with Daron Acemoglu 
and Amy Finkelstein, studies how local area health spending 
responds to permanent changes in local area income. This 
chapter is motivated by the fact that health expenditures as 
a share of GDP in the United States have more than tripled 
over the last half century, from 5 percent in 1960 to 16 per-
cent in 2005 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
2006). A common conjecture is that the rise in the share of 
income spent on health care expenditures is a direct, or at 
least a natural, consequence of the secular increase in living 
standards—because health care is a “luxury good.”2 The 
Economist magazine stated this as a conventional wisdom 
in 1993, writing: “As with luxury goods, health spending 
tends to rise disproportionately as countries become richer” 
(quoted in Blomqvist and Carter [1997], p. 27). 
This view has recently been forcefully articulated by Hall 
and Jones (2007). They argue that extension allows individu-
als to escape diminishing marginal utility of consumption 
within a period. The Hall-Jones view also receives indirect 
support from the very high estimates of the value of life and 
value of health provided by Nordhaus (2003) and Murphy 
and Topel (2003, 2006). The fact that most other Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries have also experienced substantial growth in their 
health sector over the last half century (OECD 2004) also 
makes the secular rise in incomes a natural candidate to ex-
plain the rise in the health share of GDP in the United States.
Understanding the extent to which the rise in the health 
share of GDP is a direct consequence of the rise in living 
standards is important for several reasons. First, it enables a 
proper accounting of the notable growth in the United States 
(and OECD) health care sector over the last half century. 
Second, it is necessary for forecasting how health care 
spending is likely to evolve in coming years. Finally, it is a 
crucial fi rst step toward an assessment of the optimality of 
the growth of the health care sector. In particular, if health 
spending is strongly increasing in income, so that rising 
income can explain most or all of the rising health share, it 
would be more likely that the increasing share of GDP al-
located to health is socially optimal.3
The relationship between income and health spending is 
the subject of a voluminous empirical literature. Remarkably, 
however, virtually all existing estimates are based on simple 
correlations of income and health care spending, across 
individuals, across countries, or over time. These correlations 
are consistent with income elasticities ranging from close to 
0 to substantially above 1.4 In light of the paucity of exist-
ing evidence, Hall and Jones (2007) conclude their paper by 
stating that, “Our model makes the strong prediction that if 
one looks hard enough and carefully enough, one ought to be 
able to see income effects [with elasticities above 1] in the 
micro data. Future empirical work will be needed to judge 
this prediction.” 
The objective here is to provide causal estimates of the 
effect of income on aggregate health spend ing. The strategy 
is to exploit the time-series variation in global oil prices 
between 1970 and 1990, which impacted incomes differ-
entially across different parts of the Southern United States 
that vary in the oil intensity of the local economy. In our 
baseline specifi cation we approximate local economies by 
economics subregions (ESRs), which consist of groups of 
counties within a state that have strong economic ties. We 
focus on the southern United States to increase the compa-
rability of the ESRs, in particular to minimize the likelihood 
of differential trends in health care expenditure driven by 
other factors. Our empirical strategy exploits the interaction 
between global oil prices and ESR-level importance of oil in 
the economy as an instrument for income. Our main proxy 
for the importance of oil is the size of preexisting oil reserves 
in an ESR. The identifying assumption is that the interac-
tion between global oil price changes and local oil reserves 
should have no effect on changes in the demand for health 
care, except through income. We provide several pieces of 
evidence that are supportive of the validity of this identify-
ing assumption. Using this instrumental-variable strategy we 
estimate an elasticity of ESR-level hospital spending with 
respect to ESR-level income of 0.72 (standard error = 0.21). 
Point estimates of the income elasticity from a wide range 
of alternative specifi cations fall on both sides of our baseline 
estimate, but are almost always less than 1. 
Because our instrument impacts incomes at the ESR level 
(rather than individual income), our estimates correspond to 
local general equilibrium effects of income changes, but will 
not capture any global or national general equilibrium ef-
fects.5 Of particular concern is that if the growth of the health 
care market resulting from the rise in global incomes induced 
more innovation, our estimates may not incorporate the 
implications of these induced innovations on health expendi-
tures. Our analysis suggests that signifi cantly larger elastici-
ties resulting from these induced innovation general equi-
librium effects are unlikely for two reasons. First, the same 
induced innovation effects working at the national or global 
level should manifest themselves as increased technology 
adoption or entry of new hospitals at the local (ESR) level. 
However, we fi nd no statistically or substantively signifi cant 
effects of local income on hospital entry or on various mea-
sures of technology adoption at the ESR level. In this light, a 
signifi cant global-induced innovation effect seems unlikely. 
Second, technological change should be more rapid for sec-
tors that are expanding faster than others (e.g., Acemoglu 
2010 Dissertation Summaries 9
2002; Acemoglu and Linn 2004). Since health care appears 
to have an income elasticity above 1, induced innovations 
should relatively favor the non-health sectors that have an 
income elasticity above 1.
We therefore use our local general equilibrium income 
elasticity estimate to perform a back of the envelope calcula-
tion of the role that rising income has played in the rising 
U.S. health share. Our central point estimate of 0.72 suggests 
that rising income would be associated with a modest decline 
in the health share of GDP. Perhaps more informatively, the 
upper end of the 95 percent confi dence interval of this esti-
mate is 1.13; this allows us to reject the hypothesis that rising 
real income explains more than 0.5 percentage points of the 
11 percentage point increase in the health share of U.S. GDP 
between 1960 and 2005. 
Chapter 3
The third chapter of the dissertation, written jointly 
with Kory Kroft, studies theoretically and empirically how 
optimal Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefi ts vary with 
local labor market conditions. This chapter is motivated 
by the fact that existing studies on the effect of unemploy-
ment benefi ts on unemployment durations (e.g., Moffi tt 
1985; Meyer 1990; Chetty 2008) do not distinguish between 
changes in benefi ts when local labor market conditions are 
good and changes in benefi ts when local labor market condi-
tions are poor. As Alan Krueger and Bruce Meyer (2002, 
pp. 64–65) remark: “[F]or some programs, such as UI, it is 
quite likely that the adverse incentive effects vary over the 
business cycle. For example, there is probably less of an ef-
fi ciency loss from reduced search effort by the unemployed 
during a recession than during a boom. As a consequence, 
it may be optimal to expand the generosity of UI during 
economic downturns . . . Unfortunately, this is an area in 
which little empirical research is currently available to guide 
policymakers.” 
If the moral hazard cost of UI depends on local labor 
market con ditions, this may imply that optimal UI benefi ts 
should respond to shifts in local labor demand. However, 
there exists little empirical evidence on measuring how local 
labor market conditions affect the moral hazard cost of UI, 
since many of the studies that conduct a welfare analysis of 
UI do not consider whether and to what extent UI benefi ts 
should vary with local labor market conditions (Baily 1978; 
Chetty 2006, 2008; Shimer and Werning 2007; Kroft 2008). 
In this chapter, we conduct both positive and normative 
economic analyses to investigate how local labor market 
conditions affect the moral hazard cost of UI. On the posi-
tive side, we consider the disincentive effect of UI and the 
unemployment rate. We fi rst consider workers who set a 
reservation wage and face an exogenous arrival rate of job 
offers. In this version of the model, the relationship between 
the unemployment rate and elasticity of duration with respect 
to the UI benefi t level is theoretically ambiguous; however, 
when we calibrate the model using realistic parameter values 
selected from the literature, the duration elasticity is posi-
tively correlated with the unemployment rate.6 This analysis 
suggests that the moral hazard cost of UI increases with the 
unemployment rate, contrary to the speculation of Krueger 
and Meyer (2002), as well as existing UI policy in the United 
States and many other developed countries. 
We extend the search model to encapsulate the more 
realistic scenario where workers affect the job fi nding rate 
by increasing their search efforts. In this model with an 
endogenous job offer arrival rate, the elasticity of unemploy-
ment duration with respect to the UI benefi ts is the sum of 
behavioral responses of reservation wages and search effort. 
We show that whether moral hazard rises or falls with the un-
employment rate depends on the relative importance of these 
two behavioral channels. 
Recent empirical work on the behavioral responses to 
social insurance programs fi nds that more generous benefi ts 
do not lead to higher wages (see Card, Chetty, and Weber 
2007). Given that higher UI benefi ts raise durations, this 
leads us to suspect that the search effort channel is empiri-
cally more important than the reservation wage channel. We 
examine this question by calibrating the search model with 
endogenous search effort and considering how variation in 
local labor market conditions affects the duration elasticity. 
For different ranges of parameter values, the elasticity can be 
either positively or negatively related to the unemployment 
rate. This ambiguity is coming entirely through the search 
channel—the reservation wage component of the duration 
elasticity is always increasing with the unemployment rate. 
We thus conclude from our model and calibrations that the 
relationship between the duration elasticity and the local 
unemployment rate is ultimately an empirical question. 
To empirically test how the duration elasticity varies with 
the local unemployment rate, we exploit variation in UI ben-
efi t levels within states over time and interact the effect of 
UI benefi t generosity with the state unemployment rate.7 Our 
fi ndings indicate that the elasticity of unem ployment duration 
with respect to UI benefi ts is signifi cantly lower when the 
local unemployment rate is high. In our preferred specifi ca-
tion, the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to 
UI benefi ts is 0.741 (s.e. 0.340) at the mean unemployment 
rate. However, a 1 standard deviation increase in the unem-
ployment rate (an increase of 1.68 percentage points) reduces 
the magnitude of the duration elasticity by 0.239 to 0.502 (a 
decline in magnitude of 32.3 percent). To in terpret this fi nd-
ing as evidence that the moral hazard cost of UI falls with the 
unemployment rate, we conduct a variety of robustness tests 
to address concerns that the interaction effect we estimate is 
driven by compositional changes, unobserved trends, sample 
selection, and liquidity effects, and fi nd no evidence that any 
of these concerns are primarily responsible for our effect. We 
therefore conclude that the association between the duration 
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elasticity and the local unemployment rate indicates that 
the moral hazard cost of UI varies systematically with local 
labor market conditions. 
Finally, we show that when the moral hazard cost of UI 
depends on local labor market con ditions, this has impor-
tant implications for the welfare consequences of UI. We 
develop a simple formula for the optimal level of unemploy-
ment benefi ts which takes into account how the behavioral 
response to UI benefi ts varies with local labor market condi-
tions. The formula is stated in terms of our reduced-form 
parameter estimates and is thus in the spirit of the “suffi cient 
statistics” ap proach to welfare analysis (Chetty 2009). The 
primary advantage of this method is that it can be imple-
mented with relatively few parameter estimates.8 Further-
more, these parameters can often be empirically estimated 
using a credible quasi-experimental research design. One 
disadvantage of this approach is that it is not well-suited to 
out-of-sample counterfactual analysis because the suffi cient 
statistics are only valid for relatively “local” changes in the 
policy-relevant parameters. Using our reduced-form empiri-
cal estimates to calibrate the optimal UI formula implied by 
our model, we fi nd that a 1 standard deviation increase in 
the local unemployment rate leads to a 6.4 percentage point 
increase in the optimal replacement rate. To give a sense of 
the magnitude of this policy change, it is roughly equivalent 
to a 1 unit change in the coeffi cient of relative risk aversion 
in the model (e.g., from γ = 2 to γ = 3).
Notes
1. Throughout the paper I use the term “concave housing supply 
curve” to imply that positive housing demand shocks increase 
housing prices less than equal-sized negative shocks reduce 
housing prices. More formally, a concave housing supply curve 
implies that ∂2(housing price)/∂(housing supply)2
 
< 0.
2. Throughout we use the term luxury good to designate an empiri-
cal income elasticity greater than 1 (and similarly “necessity” 
refers to an elasticity less than 1). This responsiveness to income 
may result from preferences, policy or other factors.
3. Of course, a large role for income would only be suggestive, 
not dispositive. A systematic analysis of social optimality would 
also have to consider potential externalities in health provision 
and in health R&D, as well as informational and institutional 
constraints in the health care market. 
4. OECD (2004) provides a survey of the large empirical literature 
on the correlation between income and health spending (see, 
particularly, Annex 2B). The cross-sectional relationship across 
individuals between income and health spending tends to be 
small or negative (e.g., Newhouse and Phelps 1976). In contrast, 
cross-country analysis tends to suggest income elasticities great-
er than 1 (e.g., Newhouse 1977; Gerdtham and Jonsson 2000), 
as do time-series analyses of the relationship between income 
growth and growth in health spending for individual countries 
(e.g., Fogel 1999). 
5. We also present results at the state level rather than the ESR 
level. This reduces our cross-sectional variation in oil intensity 
but allows us to capture general equilibrium effects at a higher 
level of geographic aggregation than the ESR. The results are 
similar.
6. Additionally, we show that we can resolve the theoretical ambi-
guity by making assumptions on the distribution of wages. If the 
distribution of wages has a nonincreasing hazard rate (as would 
be the case if wage offers had a Pareto distribution), then the 
duration elasticity will be increasing in the unemployment rate. 
7. In ongoing work we are constructing variation in state unem-
ployment rates that is driven by plausibly exogenous shifts in 
local labor demand by following the procedure in Bartik (1991).
8. We cannot conduct a full suffi cient statistics analysis without 
reduced-form estimates of how the consumption smoothing 
benefi ts of UI vary with local labor market conditions. We hope 
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